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Abstract This article examines China’s major development contributions, looking at its wider impact on
world development. In particular, the article examines the impact of China’s development on the changing
pattern between the North and South and the human development index. The factors and related regimes
behind these phenomena are discussed and a conceptual model is constructed, providing a meta-analysis of
the evolution of China’s role, based on the structural interpretation of external impetus and barriers, as well
as internal advantages and shortcomings. The authors’ long-term projections show that the rise of the
South, led by China, will be the most important shift in the world’s landscape with respect to the
development of the emerging world, perhaps leading other large developing economies to play a more
prominent role in international development in the future, bringing common development, common
prosperity and common progress to the world.
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Introduction
In the decades after the Second World War,
especially since the end of the Cold War in 1990,
the rise of the South has become increasingly
apparent. Generally speaking, the North usually
refers to the developed world with the highest
income level, which has dominated global
economic output since the industrial revolution.
In contrast, the rising of the South is quite
recent, driven by the emerging economies.
Among the emerging economies, China is clearly
the most significant rising power, being already the
second largest economy in the world. Most
research has focused on the overall amount of
China’s economic output, its labour force,
investment and trade, together with the challenge
it faces in terms of energy consumption and carbon
emission. This article not only highlights China’s
contribution to the rise of the South in these fields,
but also discusses China’s contribution in terms of
poverty alleviation, especially from the perspective
of income and the Human Development Index
(HDI). This article focuses on the major trends
outlined above and predicts the future
development trends for both China and the world.
1 The changing pattern of international
development: rise of the South
The structure of the global population will shift
significantly from rural to urban, with an
increasing rate of global urbanisation, which will
reach 59 per cent by 2030.1 By that time, the
South will contain 81.8 per cent of the urban
population, while the North will be home to less
than 20 per cent (see Table 1). Although the
urbanisation rate is likely to slow, the annual
average growth of the urban population will top
1 per cent. In this process, the cluster effect of
urbanisation will become more obvious. A higher
level of urbanisation means a larger consumer
market, especially in the South, which will
become a leading player in the growth of global
consumption. By 2025, two billion people, or
25 per cent of the global population, will live in
the world’s 600 largest cities. These cities will
create US$64 trillion in gross domestic product
(GDP), close to 60 per cent of global GDP. There
will be 735 million families with an average
annual income per capita of US$32,000 in the
600 largest cities. Of these, 235 million families
will be living in developing countries, with their
per capita annual income at more than
US$20,000 (McKinsey Global Institute 2011).
However, city slums are likely to become a factor
influencing the quality of urbanisation
development. This is a glaring problem facing
the governments of all countries as they pursue
their urbanisation strategies.
In the current golden age of economic
development, there will be major changes in the
global economic landscape. The economic
strength of the South and the North will be
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Table 1 World urban population percentages for the South and the North (1950–2030)
1950 1970 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
The South 52.4 61.5 71.7 75.1 77.6 79.8 81.8
China 8.8 10.7 13.4 16.0 19.1 21.0 22.9
India 8.7 8.2 9.8 10.2 10.5 11.1 12.0
Russia 6.2 6.1 4.8 3.8 2.9 2.4 2.0
Brazil 2.7 4.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.0
The North 47.6 38.5 28.3 24.9 22.4 20.2 18.2
USA 13.9 11.6 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.6
EU 21.5 16.1 11.2 9.2 8.2 7.3 6.5
Japan 4.0 4.2 3.4 2.9 2.4 2.1 1.7
Note The North refers to advanced economies as defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They include
34 countries; the EU includes 27 countries; the South refers to countries that are not included in the North.
Source Authors’ own with data from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat (2010); data for China were sourced from the national population census from various years. 
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reversed. Not only will China and India return to
1820 levels by 2030, all countries of the South
will return to 1820 levels, representing a classic
U-turn.
The rapid rise of the South has meant that as of
2010 the GDP (measured by purchasing power
parity (PPP) in 1990 constant price) of the South is
now larger (52.4 per cent) than the North (47.6 per
cent); this is an obvious change in the status quo
where previously the North had dominated the
world economic order. By 2030, the South could
represent 66.9 per cent of countries and the North
could be further reduced to 33.1 per cent. The
South could dominate the world economy.
We are now at the mid-point of this period of
growth. This trend is now commonplace
worldwide, albeit accompanied by tributaries, with
local counter-currents and we are seeing more
and more countries becoming involved. Although
this is now an irreversible worldwide trend, there
may still be international financial crises.
Emerging economies have become a fresh
motivating force behind global economic growth.
China, in particular, is both the biggest
beneficiary and the greatest supporter of the
golden age of world economic development.
From 2000 to 2030, countries with massive
populations, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa (BRICS), will become the
central forces propelling global economic growth.
By 2030, it is possible that the BRICS countries
will have a combined economic aggregate
representing 60.1 per cent of the world’s total
with that of China alone exceeding the combined
total of the North (see Table 2).
In contrast, the economic aggregates of the USA,
the EU and Japan will drop from 18.4 per cent,
18.1 per cent and 5.4 per cent, to 15.1 per cent,
13.1 per cent and 3.2 per cent, respectively. By
2030, the five biggest world economies will be those
of China, India, the USA, the EU and Brazil.2
Emerging countries will play an increasingly
important role in the international trade system,
ending the long-term domination of the North.
First, the factories of the world will be
transferred from the North to the South. In
1870, the ratio of international exports between
the South and the North was essentially 30:70. In
2010, the ratio was 40:60. By 2030 it will be
70:30, by which point China’s total exports will
be close to a quarter of the world’s total (see
Table 3). Then, the world market will also be
transferred from the North to the South. In
1950, the ratio of the South and the North in
international imports was 30:70. By 2020 it will
be 50:50, and 60:40 by 2030, China’s total
imports will be more than a quarter of the
world’s total and China will be a net importer
instead of net exporter (see Table 3).
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Table 2 World total GDP (PPP) percentages for the South and the North (1820–2030)
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 2000 2010 2020 2030
The South 70.3 53.1 42.1 39.5 39.9 43.0 52.4 60.5 66.9
China 33.0 17.1 8.8 4.6 4.6 11.8 20.7 28.9 33.4
India 16.1 12.2 7.5 4.2 3.1 5.2 8.0 12.2 18.6
Russia 5.4 7.5 8.5 9.6 9.4 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.0
Brazil 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.7 2.5 2.7 2.6 3.6 5.1
The North 29.7 46.9 57.9 60.5 60.1 57.0 47.6 39.5 33.1
USA 1.8 8.9 18.9 27.3 22.1 21.9 18.4 16.7 15.1
EU 23.3 32.0 35.8 27.1 27.1 21.5 18.1 15.7 13.1
Japan 3.0 2.3 2.6 3.0 7.8 7.2 5.4 4.4 3.2
China/USA 18.3 1.9 0.47 0.17 0.2 0.5 1.1 1.7 2.2
Note GDP (PPP) is in 1990 international dollars.
Source Authors’ own with data for 1820–2000 sourced from Maddison (2010); data regarding growth from 2010 to
2030 for the world and major economies are the estimates of the authors.
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In the international trade system, agricultural
trade will increase but the percentage will
continue to drop and service trades will rapidly
increase, with the percentage of total
international trade increasing from 20 per cent
(currently) to approximately 30 per cent.
Trade liberalisation will remain a mainstream
worldwide trend; however, this will be
accompanied by a long-term conflict between
trade liberalisation and trade protectionism.
Country-specific trade friction cannot be
avoided. There is even the possibility of an
outbreak of local or regional trade wars, with the
world powers being both interdependent and
locked in such conflicts.
Until 2030, China will have a double role in
world trade and investments: China will be
transformed from a net exporter to a net
importer; and from a net investment inflow
country to a net outflow country. Since the Doha
round of negotiations by the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the environment and
order of international trade has improved, and
further improvements are expected. China’s
opportunities in the international trade system
far outweigh any possible challenges. In the
future trading system, the importers will be the
winners. China will enjoy market advantages.
Chinese transition from ‘workshop’ to ‘market’
will further strengthen the position and role of
China in the international trade system.
From 2010 to 2030, global foreign direct
investment (FDI) will maintain a steady growth
rate, most likely the 3 per cent annual growth
that has been registered since the beginning of
the 1990s. Newly added foreign investments will
mainly come from the emerging markets of
China, India, Brazil and Russia. Global FDI will
be characterised by the interaction between the
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Table 3 Total global export percentages for the South and the North (1870–2030)
1870 1950 1973 1998 2010 2020 2030
The South 28.1 37.6 39.2 41.4 62.2 68.0 72.0
China 2.8 2.1 0.7 3.3 10.4 18.0 24.0
India 6.9 1.9 0.6 0.7 1.4 2.4 5.0
Russia 0.0 2.2 3.4 2.1 2.5 2.7 3.5
Brazil 1.7 1.2 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.9
The North 71.9 62.4 60.8 58.6 37.8 32.0 28.0
USA 5.0 14.6 10.3 12.8 8.4 10.0 9.0
EU 60.4 38.9 43.2 38.1 15.7 14.0 12.0
Japan 0.1 1.2 5.6 5.9 5.1 5.0 4.0
Source Authors’ own; data for 1820–2000 was sourced from Maddison (1995, 2001). 2020 and 2030 data are
estimated by the authors based on international trade statistics.
Table 4 World total FDI inflow volume percentages for the South and the North
1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 2020 2030
The South 28.9 13.9 16.9 18.8 49.2 60.0 75.0
China 0.0 0.1 1.7 2.9 8.5 15.0 20.0
The North 71.1 86.1 83.1 81.2 50.8 40.0 25.0
NAFTA 25.4 45.9 28.2 28.5 14.5 10.0 10.0
EU 38.6 39.4 46.9 49.8 32.5 15.0 18.0
Source Authors’ own with data from UNCTAD (2011); data for 2020 and 2030 are the estimates of the authors.
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inflow and outflow of FDI, with a transition of
investment from developed countries to
developing countries and from developing
countries to developed countries.
International capital will mainly flow into the
South. From 2010 to 2030, the South will become
the main destination for FDI. By 2030, 75 per
cent of FDI will flow into the South (compared
with approximately 20 per cent in 2000) (see
Table 4). The South will become attractive to
FDI because their labour and production costs
are lower than in the North. In addition, the
South will see improved levels of economic
development, and higher average annual
incomes. Market demand and market size will
continue to expand and their investment
conditions will also improve.
In terms of FDI reserves, the North will still
occupy a dominant position but the South will be
closing the gap. By 2030, the FDI reserves of the
South will reach 40 per cent of the world’s total
while that of China will reach 8.0 per cent.
The FDI outflow of emerging economies (i.e.
BRICS countries) will significantly increase; in
2008 it reached US$147 billion, accounting for
9 per cent of the global FDI outflow. Only ten
years earlier, it had measured 1 per cent
(UNCTAD 2010). This value will continue to
increase.
China will become the biggest foreign direct
investor in the world. From 2002 to 2009, China’s
annual contribution to global FDI inflow was
3 per cent, with a global FDI outflow of 5.5 per
cent. In recent years, China’s foreign direct
investment has increased more than eight times,
from 0.5 per cent in 2002 to 4.4 per cent in 2009.
China has become the fifth largest foreign direct
investor. If calculated using a low GDP
percentage of 5 per cent, China’s FDI will
increase by US$1 trillion by 2020. If the
percentage rises to the level of 15 per cent such
as in transitional economies, then Chinese
foreign direct investment will reach
approximately US$3 trillion a year. We estimate
that by 2030, China will become the world’s
number one foreign investor, with its outbound
direct investment reaching approximately
US$4.5–5 trillion. China’s outbound investment
includes both China’s interests overseas and the
huge business opportunities and investment
interests China provides to the world. In the
future, China’s gross national product (GNP)
will exceed its GDP. However, international
investment in China will continue while the era
of China’s international investments continues.
2 The challenge of China’s rise to the South and
the world
The global primary energy demand and
consumption structure will experience a period
of adjustment, starting with a transition to green
energy sources.3 According to a prediction by the
International Energy Agency (IEA), coal
consumption will increase from 22.9 per cent in
2000 to 29.1 per cent by 2030; petroleum
consumption will reduce from 36.5 per cent in
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Table 5 World total percentages of the primary energy demands (1980–2030)
1980 2000 2007 2015 2020 2030
The South 44.0 47.6 54.2 59.5 62.1 65.4
China 8.3 11.0 16.4 20.6 22.1 22.8
India 2.9 4.6 5.0 5.7 6.2 7.7
Latin America 4.0 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.9
The North 56.0 52.4 45.8 40.5 37.9 34.6
USA 24.9 22.8 19.5 17.0 15.8 14.3
EU 16.8 14.6 12.7 11.8 10.6
Japan 4.8 5.2 4.3 3.6 3.3 2.9
Source Authors’ own with data from International Energy Agency (2009); data for 2020 and 2030 are estimates
based on an IEA model.
1Intro IDSB45.4.qxd  24/06/2014  10:40  Page 10
2000 to 29.8 per cent by 2030. Renewable energy
sources such as nuclear energy, water energy and
biological energy are expected to remain stable.
During this period, all countries will be
dedicated to developing green energy, and to the
research and development (R&D) of new energy
technologies such as wind energy, solar energy
and bio-energy. By 2030 the world will enter a
crucial transition period regarding energy
consumption. The production of global liquid
hydrocarbon (such as petroleum and liquefied
natural gas) will begin to decline. By that stage,
it will be difficult to predict whether new energy
technologies will be able to replace traditional
energies (National Intelligence Council 2008).
The South will quickly become the main
consumer of primary energy, with China in first
place. The North will consume 34.6 per cent of
primary energy sources, compared with 56 per
cent in 1980. The South’s primary energy
consumption will jump from 44 per cent to
65.4 per cent. By 2030 China’s primary energy
demand will reach 22.8 per cent of the world’s
total, equal to those of the USA and the EU
combined (see Table 5).
Climate change will become a common challenge
for all countries. China has become the largest
carbon dioxide emitter during the past decade,
and will represent 28.3 per cent of the world’s
total emission by 2020, which is almost the total
of all North countries and two-fifths of that of
the South countries (see Table 6). Global carbon
emissions are likely to peak between 2020 and
2030 and China will no doubt contribute more to
the absolute mitigation of carbon than just
reducing the relative emission intensity in its
current commitment. IEA predictions show that
it is likely to peak sometime between 2020 and
2030 if all countries cooperate in the launching
of an energy and environmental revolution.
Carbon emissions will drop sharply after that
time, when global economic development is
expected to reduce carbon emissions.4
The green industrial revolution will become the
goal of the world. At its core is the desire to
fundamentally change the worldwide economic
development model and roadmap that has been
in place since 1750. In the twenty-first century,
China will face its most important strategic
opportunity to become an active participant of
this green revolution and a leader of innovation.
China will initiate innovative green action and
implement green development strategies – it will
synchronise its step with the rest of the world.
China will strive to bring about its peak carbon
emissions sometime in 2020–50, followed by a
sharp decline.
3 Per capita contribution and poverty alleviation
The sustained high growth of China and India,
both of which have populations numbering in the
billions, could stimulate a shift from the ‘great
divergence era’, which lasted for two centuries,
to the ‘great convergence era’ of the twenty-first
century,5 although the inequity coefficients of
both countries will remain high.
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Table 6 World percentage of carbon dioxide emission
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 2000 2010 2020 2030
The South 8.1 20.8 27.0 34.7 47.8 58.4 64.0 70.3 74.1
China 0.3 1.3 5.7 13.7 23.8 28.3 28.3 
India 1.0 1.1 1.3 4.8 5.4 6.6 8.4 
Latin America 0.7 2.7 3.7 5.4 3.4 3.6 3.6 
The North 91.9 79.2 73.0 65.3 52.2 41.6 36.0 29.7 25.9
USA 1.6 18.3 41.7 42.5 28.6 23.1 17.9 15.0 13.3 
EU 90.3 60.6 26.7 17.4 14.7 10.0 12.2 9.8 8.3 
Japan 1.6 1.7 5.9 4.9 3.8 3.2 2.7 
Source Authors’ own: data for 1820–2000 are from Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (2010); data for
2020–20 are estimates based on the data in International Energy Agency (2012).
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We predict that in the next 20 years, the world
will enter into an era of ‘great convergence’,
largely because of the independent development
experienced by the South. International inequity
will be reduced in many areas, including
education,6 health,7 per capita GDP and per
capita income with respect to other social
indicators. The South and the North will
converge in terms of education and health,
driven by the globalisation of knowledge and
politics, economics and education.
In the next 20 years, the income levels of all
countries will converge. In 2010, the per capita
GDP of the South was, by and large, one-sixth of
the average of the North. However, with the
rapid development of the South, its per capita
GDP is expected to reach one-third of that of the
North by 2030. The income gap between the two
groups will quickly narrow, with the per capita
GDP catching-up indices of the two biggest
countries in the South, China and India, likely to
reach 85.7 per cent and 43.6 per cent of the
North, respectively (see Table 7). China and
India’s economic growth will mitigate worsening
income inequity (World Bank 2006).
We estimate that China’s GDP growth will remain
at 7–8 per cent from 2010 to 2030 (see Annex). As
China’s population records zero growth (below
2 per cent), China’s per capita GDP growth will
remain at 7 per cent or higher, which is 1.8
percentage points less than the period 1978–2010.
Up to 2030, China’s per capita GDP will be 4.2
times that of 2010 and 62.5 times that of 1978.
We have adopted three methods to calculate the
US dollar value of per capita GDP from 2010 to
2030 and the catch-up coefficient of China’s per
capita GDP vis-à-vis the US per capita GDP. The
first is the exchange rate method or market
exchange rate method, taking into account
China’s nominal GDP average deflator and the
changes in the exchange rate of the Chinese
renminbi (RMB) to the dollar; the second is the
PPP current price method adopted by the World
Bank, taking into account the changes in the
dollar price; the third is the PPP constant price
adopted by Maddison, with the 1990
international dollar price as the benchmark.
No matter what method is used, the results
unanimously indicate a convergence in the
following decades. China’s per capita GDP was
2.6–11.7 per cent of that of the USA in 2000; up
to 2010 the percentage was 10–25 per cent; and
by 2020, it will be 25–40 per cent, which means
China will be in for a para-high income period.
By 2030 China’s per capita GDP will be about
half that of the USA,8 representing China’s entry
into the high-income stage (see Table 8).
Over the past three decades of reform and
opening-up, China’s greatest achievement has
been its large-scale poverty reduction. The basic
national conditions of China were not only a
‘large population, a weak foundation to start out
from and limited cultivated land’ (Deng 1994:
164). But it was also the largest power with the
greatest population living in poverty. If calculated
according to the internationally accepted poverty
line, that is, living on US$1 per person per day,
the number of people living below the
international poverty line was probably as many
as 860 million, with the international poverty
occurrence of about 90 per cent.9 If calculated by
the three international poverty lines of US$1,
US$1.25 and US$2, China’s contribution to global
poverty reduction has 95.1 per cent, 122 per cent
and 951 per cent respectively over the period
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Table 7 Catching-up coefficients of per capita GDP (1950–2030)
1950 1970 2000 2010 2020 2030
The South 20.5 17.1 13.5 18.1 24.1 34.4
Developing Asian countries 11.8 10.0 13.5 21.0 29.6 44.4
China 8.3 7.1 15.2 31.5 55.0 85.7
India 11.3 7.0 8.1 13.3 23.2 43.6
Note The North countries = 100.
Source Authors’ own with data from Maddison (2010); Population Division of the Department of Economic and
Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2010); data for 2020 and 2030 are the estimates of the authors.
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1981–2005 (see Table 9). According to the recent
UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG)
report, the goal of cutting extreme poverty by
half is expected to be realised by 2015. The
population living on less than US$1 a day was
1.8 billion in 1999, reduced to 1.4 billion by 2005.
The report attributes this mainly to the
contributions made by China.
The relative poverty rate of developing countries
decreased from 46 per cent to 27 per cent from
1990 to 2005. By 2015, the total poverty
occurrence rate is expected to drop below 15 per
cent (United Nations 2011). According to this
trend, the poverty occurrence rate in developing
countries will drop below 10 per cent by 2020 and
then below 5 per cent by 2030 (see Table 10),
basically eliminating international absolute
poverty. Therefore, the United Nations and the
international community will have to formulate a
further MDG for the second stage (2015–30).
With the close cooperation of all governments
and effective international governance, we may
well see the realisation of this dream.
The world as a whole is likely to enter a stage of
high human development. According to a new
computation method developed by United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
China’s HDI was 0.663 in 2010 (an upper-middle
level ranking) while the world’s HDI was 0.624 (a
lower-middle level ranking). By 2020 global HDI
will be at 0.696, close to the upper levels, while
China’s HDI will be 0.750, well within the upper
level.
In terms of the composition of HDI, global per
capita GDP will reach US$14,000 by 2020; the
average number of years of education will reach
eight, with the expected number being 13 years;
and the expected mean life expectancy will be
75 years. For China, these four indicators will be
US$14,000, ten years, 14 years, and 77.5 years
respectively. By 2030, global HDI will be 0.703,
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Table 8 China’s per capita GDP and catch-up coefficient (2000–30)
2000 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Exchange rate (current price)
China 925 4,249 8,220 16,025 27,255 46,670
USA 35,040 47,390 55,360 64,838 76,177 89,798
2.6 9.0 14.8 24.7 35.8 52.0
PPP (current price) (World Bank)
China 2,305 7,164 11,137 17,448 25,063 36,246
USA 35,040 46,626 50,554 54,955 59,926 65,566
6.6 15.4 22.0 31.8 41.8 55.3
PPP (1990 price) (Maddison)
China 3,335 7,822 10,748 14,883 18,896 24,153
USA 28,433 30,589 33,166 36,053 39,314 43,014
11.7 25.6 32.4 41.3 48.1 56.2
Note (1) For the GDP aggregate calculated using the exchange rate method, 2010–20, China’s GDP real growth will
be 8 per cent, GDP deflator will be 3 per cent, appreciation of RMB to the dollar will be 3 per cent, US GDP real
growth will be 2 per cent, and GDP deflator will be 2 per cent; for 2020–30, China’s GDP real growth will be
7 per cent, GDP deflator will be 2 per cent, appreciation of RMB to the dollar will be 2 per cent, US GDP real
growth will be 2 per cent, GDP deflator will be 2 per cent. (2) For the GDP aggregate calculated using the PPP
current price method, 2010–230, the GDP deflator will be 2.5 per cent. (3) For the GDP aggregate calculated using
the PPP constant price, 2010–20, China’s GDP growth will be 7 per cent, and for 2020–30, China’s GDP growth
will be 5 per cent; US GDP growth will be 2.5 per cent for 2010–30.
Source Authors’ own with data from World Bank (2011); Maddison (2010); Population Division of the Department of
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2010).
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recognised as a high level, while China’s HDI will
be 0.776 and is likely to exceed 0.800 between
2040 and 2050. In terms of HDI indicators, by
2030 global per capita GDP will reach US$19,000;
the average length of education will be 9.5 years;
expected education will be 14 years; the mean life
expectancy will be 79 years. These four indicators
for China will be US$23,000, ten years, 16 years,
and 80 years, respectively.
It took China 25 years to enter the lower-middle
development level from an extremely low level.
It took a further 20 years to leave that level and
enter the upper-middle level. By 2015, China will
enter a stage of high human development. In 20
years’ time, China will enjoy a period of
extremely high human development.
No matter what method is used, China’s per
capita GDP by 2030 will be approximately 50 per
cent of the USA figure. However, its HDI will be
approximately 85 per cent of that of the USA;
the gap in life expectancy will be narrowed to
only 1.3 years. The expected years of schooling
will exceed the figure for the USA. This
information is useful to determine which level
China will reach in the world and when (it is
important to note that the HDI of the USA is not
the highest worldwide).
Many countries increase their HDI by relying on
the growth of their GDP per capita. China’s per
capita GDP growth between 1980 and 1990
contributed to 79.8 per cent of HDI growth. It
decreased somewhat to 62.6 per cent between
1990 and 2000 and a similar level between 2000
and 2010. In our projection, its contribution will
be less than 50 per cent for the first time
between 2010 and 2020 and we expect it to be as
low as 36.0 per cent between 2020 and 2030. In
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Table 9 Population under the international poverty line (1981–2008)
Less than one dollar Less than 1.25 dollars
China India World China India Total
1981 730.4 296.1 1535.3 835.1 420.5 1913.4
1987 412.4 285.3 1228.3 585.7 428 1718.2
1990 499.1 282.5 1303.2 683.2 435.5 1817.5
1996 288.7 271.3 1132.8 442.8 441.8 1672
1999 302.4 270.1 1146 446.7 447.2 1694.8
2002 244.7 276.1 1090.2 363.2 460.5 1629.4
2005 106.1 266.5 879 207.7 455.8 1399.8
Reduction -624.3 -29.6 -656.3 -627.4 35.3 -513.6
Contribution (%) 95.1 4.5 100.0 122.0 -6.9 100.0
Source Author’s calculation based on Chen and Ravallion (2008). 
Table 10 International poverty occurrence rate (1990–2030)
1990 2005 2015 2020 2030
China 60.2 15.9 <5 1
India 51.3 41.6 22 15 <10
Other developing countries 46.0 27.0 <15 <10 <5
Note The international poverty occurrence rate is calculated according to the international absolute poverty line
($1.25 per person per day).
Source Authors’ own with data from United Nations (2011); National Bureau of Statistics (2011); World Bank (2011);
the data for 2020 and 2030 are the estimates of the authors.
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contrast, China will achieve higher HDI by
relying more and more on an increase in the
areas of education and health. Between 2020 and
2030, education will surpass GDP per capita to
become the key factor of China’s HDI growth
and it will contribute more than 50 per cent
during that period of time.
4 The logic of China’s development
From the mid-1990s to the mid-twentieth century,
China lagged behind in the drive for worldwide
modernisation and was subject to bullying. In the
latter half of the twentieth century, China played
a successful game of catch-up, advancing from
behind to be at the forefront internationally. In
the twenty-first century, China will catch up with
and overtake the most developed capitalist
country in the world, the USA. This will occur not
only because of China’s one billion population, its
9.6 million square metres of territorial land, and
its several thousand years of civilisation, culture
and written language, but also because China has
a unique and superior socialist system – superior
both in terms of its socialist political system, and
in terms of the advantages of its socialist market
economy.
What do we predict for China’s future
development? The records on China’s
development both at home and abroad over the
past few decades show that neo-classical growth
theory is, in reality, unable to predict the
development of China’s economy. The
predictions of many different economic models,
no matter how precise or complicated, have been
proven far from accurate, with most models
significantly underestimating the potential of
China’s development.
In contrast, Chinese leaders have offered
accurate forecasts regarding the prospects of
China’s development. These leaders did not rely
on specialised knowledge and tools, but rather on
their political wisdom and wealth of experience.
We have looked to their experience in making our
predictions and formulating our ideas for 2030.
We have pinpointed the crucial variables that will
influence China’s long-term development and
carried out an in-depth analysis of the major
problems and contradictions. Thus, we have
conceived China’s future in a bold and forward-
looking manner, based on both economic analysis
and long-term development experience, with a
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Table 11 HDI for China, the USA and India and catch-up coefficient (1980–2030)
1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
China 0.368 0.460 0.567 0.616 0.663 0.750 0.776
USA 0.810 0.857 0.893 0.895 0.902 0.919 0.926
India 0.320 0.389 0.440 0.482 0.519 0.559 0.564
China/USA 0.45 0.54 0.63 0.69 0.74 0.82 0.84
India/USA 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.61
Source Authors’ own with data from United Nations Development Programme (2011); data for 2020 and 2030 are
the estimates of the authors.
Table 12 Contributing factors to China’s HDI (1980–2030)
Income Education Health Interactive items
1980–1990 79.8 22.4 6.0 -8.3 
1990–2000 62.6 31.9 9.6 -4.1 
2000–2010 63.9 30.9 8.5 -3.2 
2010–2020 49.4 44.0 8.3 -1.7 
2020–2030 36.0 50.7 12.8 0.5
Source Authors’ own with data from United Nations Development Programme (2011); data for 2020–2030 are the
estimates of the authors.
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focus on the orientation of China’s future
development strategy. Although we are faced with
many uncertainties regarding the future, we are
most concerned with the following questions:
What is the most significant opportunity for the
future? Which prediction is the most accurate
and how can our ideas be put into practice and
evaluated in the future?
China is conscientious, not reckless in its
development; its development is purposeful and
not spontaneous, planned and not disorderly.
China’s development path is constituted by the
integration of three trends: a natural (objective)
trend, market-driven development under the
guidance of plans, and development under the
guidance of planning and strategy. To predict
China’s development, it is necessary to take into
account the interactions among the three trends.
An objective trend is the result of spontaneous
behaviour subject to society. This reflects the
interaction between the indicators and the
development stage; that is, the trend changes with
an increase in per capita income or per capita
GDP, and has nothing to do with the variables of
government policies. With regard to the value of
an objective trend, it is necessary to consider the
various influencing factors, including the basic
national conditions, the stage of development and
the development potential, as well as taking into
account all uncertainties and restraining factors.
Only then can forward-looking predictions and
scientific calculations be made.
A market-driven value is subject to guidance by
government policies formulated in the planning
process. Policies are geared towards stimulating
market initiatives and mobilising social forces in
order to accelerate the realisation of state
objectives. However, in many circumstances, non-
governmental and market forces far exceed the
anticipation and expectations of government. Of
course, the objectives (to some degree) are also
subject to the impact of external resistance in
the process of development, and are discounted
to an extent. Thus, the market-driven value is
reduced, even to zero in some cases.
Nevertheless, due to the constraint of the third
factor, plan guidance value, these objectives will
ultimately have their bottom line.
The plan guidance value is the government
influence on the real development trend
indicators by reasonably allocating public
resources and effectively employing public forces
to either accelerate development (developmental
indicator) or to limit the development trend
(control type indicator). It reflects the role of the
visible hand of government planning. Plan
guidance value determines the intensity of the
political will on the one hand and on the other it
is based on the drawing capacity of public
resources (financial, material and human
resources), the capacity of mobilisation, and the
allocation capacity.
The above three trends also reflect China’s
superiority regarding both its development and
its political and economic system. In terms of
development, China has an advantage in being a
late-comer, and in being a large-scale power.
China possesses significant development
potential, and has fairly long periods during
which development opportunities are plentiful.
China has the momentum and conditions for
high-speed development. In terms of its political
and economic system, China has the advantage
of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, which is full
of vitality and creativity, and the advantage of
the ‘visible hand’ in terms of long-term
development strategy and planning. The organic
combination of the two, in turn, will accelerate
the speed of development while at the same time
guiding the direction of development.
5 Conclusion: China’s efforts to build a world of
harmony
The nearly 200 years of modern economic growth
represents an era of ‘great divergence’10 with the
North–South gap constantly growing wider. It is a
history of inequity, injustice and unfairness, with
the North dominating the world economic order.
We hold that the twenty-first century is the
century in which China will make huge
contributions to human development. What are
these significant contributions? China’s role and
position in the world arena enables China to be
an advocate for a ‘world of great harmony’, an
active participant and builder of a ‘world of great
harmony’, and the biggest contributor to a ‘world
of great harmony’.
China will become the biggest engine of growth
of the world. China will become the world’s
biggest market, with increasingly strong positive
externalities and a positive spillover effect. It
will make increasingly significant contributions
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to the market,11 trade,12 employment and
investment.13 China is travelling towards
development, and actively promotes fairer and
more just international economic and political
orders. China will make positive contributions to
protecting the global environment, tackling
global climate change, conserving energy,
reducing emissions and promoting a green
industrial revolution.
China will become the largest contributor of
development aid. China has formulated a new
foreign aid programme based on its existing
scheme.14 This programme requires three steps.
The first step is to bring the amount of foreign
aid as a proportion of GDP to 0.3 per cent by
2015; the second step is to increase it to 0.5 per
cent by 2020; the third step is to raise it to 1 per
cent or above by 2030. This will actively
encourage other world powers, high-income
countries, and emerging economies to increase
their development aid in proportion to their
GDPs and to expand the global aid programme.
It will also push the UN and other international
organisations to formulate an MDG for 2015–30.
The targets of China’s foreign aid programme are
fundamentally different. China mainly aids the
least developed and developing countries,
benefiting those countries in the South that are
home to 80 per cent of the world’s population. As
the biggest developing country, China has actively
promoted South–South cooperation, trade and
investment liberalisation, and fair and even
development between the South and the North.
China will become a leader in the worldwide
process of great change. China is resolutely
opposed to hegemony and power politics, and
persists in the principle of equality for all
countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or
poor. China respects the right to free choice for
people of all countries. China has made and will
continue to make worldwide contributions to
achieve global common wealth and common
prosperity, and it will undertake even greater
responsibilities. The rise of China benefits the
world as a whole. However, such development
also represents greater expectations and
responsibilities (Ban 2010). The rapid rise of
China has not only changed the pattern of inter-
power rivalries but also the role of China within
the international system. This has created
unparalleled historical development
opportunities for China.
Contemporary China is experiencing
unprecedented economic development, social
transition and social change. The contemporary
world is experiencing unprecedented
development, changes and adjustment. Peace,
development and cooperation are now
mainstream, and have created favourable
conditions for common efforts to build a world of
great harmony. For China, a foremost objective is
to safeguard world peace, prevent any further
world wars, and to prevent wars among the world
powers so as to maintain an internationally
peaceful environment for the following 20 years
(or longer). It is then necessary to promote
common development, help the countries of the
South accelerate their development, and narrow
the various inequalities between the South and
the North. Such measures will help to achieve
the internationalisation and globalisation of
common wealth. It is necessary to strengthen
mutually beneficial cooperation in order to
establish a fairer and more just global
governance structure; the key word here is
mutual. It is essential to change the current
unfair, unjust and unequal practices. Peace is the
basic condition for development; cooperation is
the basic channel for promoting development;
and development is the basic goal of peace and
cooperation.
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Annex Potential economic growth rate of China
(2011–30)
1 State space model
According to the basic theory of Phillips curve
and Okun’s Law, we can estimate the output gap
and Non-accelerating Inflation Rate of
Unemployment (NAIRU) through the dynamic
system of output, inflation and unemployment
rate (Apel and Jansson 1999). We therefore
construct a state space model, treating potential
output and unemployment rate as the
unobserved variables (state variables), to
estimate China’s potential output. The basic
structure of the model is as follows:
Equation for Phillips curve:
(1)
Here   indicates inflation rate,       indicates real
unemployment rate,      indicates NAIRU, 
indicates unemployment rate gap
and       is the random error. Phillips curve serves
as a constraint of the unobserved-components
system (UC Model). The unobserved
unemployment gap can be expressed in the
model and can be estimated together with the
parameters of the model.
Equation for Okun’s Law:
(2)
Here       indicates the logarithm of real output, 
indicates the logarithm of the potential
output,                    indicates the output gap, 
is random error and       is unknown
parameter. Equation (2) treated potential output
as an endogenous variable and ensures the
estimations of unemployment gap and output
gap are consistent with each other.
Equation for potential output:
(3)
Here      is random error and     is unknown
parameter. Equation (3) described the dynamic
features of potential output, where potential
output was assumed to follow a random walk
with drift.
Equation for unemployment rate gap:
(4)
Here       is random error and       and       are
unknown parameter. Equation (4) described the
dynamic features of unemployment rate gap,
which was assumed a first order auto regression
process.
Equation (1) to (4) form a state space model,
among which equations (1) and (2) are measure
equations (or signal equations) while equations
(3) and (4) are transition equations (or state
equations).
2 Model estimation
When estimating the model, we use the
Consumption Price Index to measure       , and
use real GDP to measure      . As China’s
unemployment statistics cannot fully reflect the
unemployment of Chinese society, we treat 
as a state variable. The interval for
the sample data was between 1952–2008. To
ensure the validity of the estimation result, we
apply non-negative constraints to the variance of    
and       by using the natural
exponential, which are expressed as      ,      ,       
and      ..
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Table A1 Estimation result of the main parameter of the model 
Parameter
Estimation 0.74 -00.84 -1.47 0.58 0.08 -6.44 -6.97 -7.71 -6.97
P Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source Authors’ own.
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Notes
* School of Public Policy and Management,
Tsinghua University. Corresponding author:
Yuning Gao, gao_yuning@tsinghua.edu.cn
1 An estimation of population growth and
population structure is a core clue to predict the
long-term development of both China and the
world, and is the basis for accurate predictions.
First, we make a prediction regarding the
natural growth trends for all indicators using a
linear model. Second, an adjustment is made
for the estimated linear values for 2015 or 2020,
based on already published development plans,
and judgements are then made regarding the
long-term trend for 2030 using a rule-of-thumb.
2 This prediction is similar to the 2007
prediction by Nobel laureate Robert Fogel
(2007), who said that by 2040 the economic
aggregates of the USA, the EU (15 countries),
India, China and Japan will be 14 per cent,
5 per cent, 12 per cent, 40 per cent and 2 per
cent, respectively.
3 Green energy has three meanings: cleaning of
traditional energy, renewable energy, and the
highly efficient use of energy.
4 If the atmosphere’s global hothouse gas
density is stabilised at 450ppm CO2 equivalent
(the so-called ‘450 scenario’), then global CO2
emissions will peak at 30.7 billion tonnes
(carbon equivalent) by 2020, CO2 emissions
will drop to 24–26 billion tonnes (carbon
equivalent) by 2030, and to ten billion tonnes
(carbon equivalent) by 2050, about half that of
1990 (20.9 billion tonnes, carbon equivalent)
(International Energy Agency 2009: 172; 2011).
5 According to the calculations of the World
Bank, since 1950, the weighted inequality (Gini
coefficient) has been in a continuous decline,
mainly because income has been growing in
population-dense countries such as China and
India. However, if China and India are
excluded, international inequality (Gini
coefficient) increased after the 1980s. Since
1950, the un-weighted country inequality (Gini
coefficient) has assumed a long-term upward
trend. However, more recently, especially in the
1990s, international inequality was reduced,
mainly because of an increase in the income of
China and South Asia (see World Bank 2006).
6 According to calculations of the World Bank,
the global average years of education received
increased from 3.4 years to 6.3 years in 2000,
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Table A2 Potential growth rate and trends (2011–30)
Projection conditions
Potential growth rate Average negative deviation Average positive deviation
1952–2010 0.08
1981–2010 -0.02 0.01
2001–05 0.11
2006–10 0.10
Potential growth rate Lower bound Upper bound
2011–15 0.09 0.07 0.10
2011–30 0.08 0.06 0.09
Projection results
Potential growth rate (%) Lower bound (%) Upper bound (%)
2011–15 8.9 6.9 10.2
2016–20 8.4 6.4 9.7
2021–25 7.4 5.5 8.7
2026–30 6.9 5.0 8.2
2011–30 7.9 5.9 9.2
Source Authors’ own.
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while the education inequity variant
coefficient dropped from 0.739 to 0.461 (see
World Bank 2006).
7 According to a study by the World Bank, while
the world’s mean life expectancy has increased,
the inequity in the mean life expectancy
among the countries has been reduced, with
the variant coefficient declining from 0.233 in
1960 to 0.194 in 2000 (see World Bank 2006).
8 This method is different from the method
used by economists, which measures the dollar
value of per capita GDP using constant price
and constant exchange rate methods. The use
of the exchange rate method underestimates
the real purchasing power of RMB and
accompanied with economic globalisation and
integration, the exchange rate of the RMB to
the dollar will assume an upward trend.
Therefore, using the exchange rate method,
the dollar value of China’s per capita GDP
would move to a long-term convergence
towards PPP current price and PPP constant
price. By 2030 the dollar value of China’s per
capita GDP would be approximately 50 per
cent of the USA according to the various
methods of calculation.
9 This is the authors’ calculation based on the
World Bank data. If calculated by the one
dollar criterion, the World Bank estimated
that the number of poor people in China in
1981 was 730 million, 430 million more than
India, which was ranked second with
296 million. But by 2002, China was no longer
the biggest country with the biggest poor
population, with the absolute figure of poor
population put at 240 million. India rose to
the number one large power with the biggest
poor population of 276 million (see Chen and
Ravallion 2008).
10 Since 1820, while the world’s per capita GDP
has been growing, the long-term trend has
been a growing disparity in income. According
to calculations and analysis by Angus
Maddison, this manifests itself in a disparity
among the various larger regions, which was
less than 3:1 in 1820, but reached 16:1 in
1992. It is also manifested in the gap among
different countries (between dominant
countries and the countries with the poorest
performances), which exceeded 3:1 in 1820
but reached 72:1 in 1992. Only a small group
of lagging countries caught up after the
Second World War and convergence occurred
(see Maddison 1995). After the Second World
War, per capita GDP in the South reduced
compared with the per capita GDP of the
North, from 20.5 per cent in 1950 to 17.1 per
cent by 1970, and to 13.5 per cent by 2000. Per
capita GDP in developing Asian countries
reduced from 11.8 per cent in 1950 to 10.0 per
cent by 1970, but increased to 13.5 per cent by
2000, thanks to the economic take-off of Asia’s
Four Little Dragons, China, India and
Southeast Asia.
11 China’s average contribution was 14.6 per
cent in 2001–09 to become the number one
contributor to economic growth.
12 According to statistics from United Nations
Trade and Development Conference
(UNTDC), China’s percentage in goods
import trade in the world rose from 4.4 per
cent to 8 per cent for 2002–09 and its
percentage in the world’s service import trade
rose from 2.9 per cent to 4.9 per cent.
13 In 2002–09, the average annual contribution
to global FDI inflow reached 3 per cent and
outflow, 5.5 per cent.
14 China’s foreign aid is made up of three
categories: free aid, interest-free loans, and
preferential loans. There are mainly eight
forms of aid: complete plants, general
materials, technical cooperation, cooperation
in human resources development, medical
teams, emergency humanitarian aid,
volunteers, and debt reduction and
exemption. According to the White Paper on
China’s foreign aid (Information Office of the
State Council 2011), China has provided aid
of 256.29 billion yuan, including 106.2 billion
yuan free aid, 76.54 billion yuan interest-free
loans, and 73.55 billion yuan of preferential
loans, accounting for 41.4 per cent, 29.9 per
cent and 28.3 per cent, respectively, in total
foreign aid. China’s foreign aid funds
experienced rapid growth, with its average
growth for 2004–09 being 29.4 per cent. By
the end of 2009, China had signed debt-
writing off protocols with 50 countries in
Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean,
and Oceania, writing off 380 debts, amounting
to 25.58 billion yuan (equal to 17 per cent of
the total aid loans).
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